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The Puzzle of PDVSA Bond Prices 
 
Paolo Colla, Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati* 
 
 
A few weeks ago, two of us posted a draft research paper on the pricing of Venezuelan sovereign 
bonds.1 We wanted to know to what extent bond prices incorporated information about contract 
terms, and whether any such price effect might vary depending on the financial condition of the 
borrower. Venezuela makes a good case study because it has a number of New York-law bonds 
outstanding with different contract terms, and because it is experiencing severe financial distress. 
In particular, Venezuelan sovereign bonds have different voting thresholds for restructuring, and 
different pari passu clauses. The bonds issued before 2003 require unanimous (100%) consent of 
the bondholders to change financial terms, and have pari passu clauses that can be used, 
Argentina-style, to enforce payment. Those issued after 2003 can be restructured with the vote of 
either 85% or 75% of the bondholders, and have pari passu clauses that make for weaker 
enforcement tools. Neither the pre- nor the post-2003 bonds permit aggregated voting across 
different bond series. 
 
Our results were straightforward. Investors attached greater value to the bonds that were tougher 
to amend; in other words, they were willing to pay for the ability to hold out in an eventual 
restructuring. This meant that the market was working to distinguish bonds with weaker and 
stronger minority creditor protections, and attached higher prices to the latter. Consistent with 
anecdotal evidence, we also found that the price effects were more pronounced in this study of a 
severely distressed government’s bond contracts than in prior studies of bonds issued by 
sovereigns in better financial health.   
 
In response to our post, a number of analysts reached out to us for details of the study. They were 
most interested in a subject that we had avoided in the paper: the question of how the pricing of 
                                                 
* Faculty at Bocconi University, Georgetown University and Duke Unversity, respectively. 
1 See Elena Carletti et al., Pricing Contract Terms in a Crisis: The Case of Venezuelan Bonds in 2016, __ CAP. 
MKTS. L. J. __ (2016, forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2794509  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2816856 
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New York-law bonds issued by Venezuela’s oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA), 
compared to the pricing of Venezuela’s pure sovereign bonds. Market participants wanted to 
know whether differences in prices between otherwise similar PDVSA and sovereign bond 
contracts presented arbitrage opportunities. PDVSA has $34 billion in outstanding bonds, 
comparable to Venezuela’s $36 billion sovereign bond stock. PDVSA has payments of slightly 
more than $4 billion coming due in October and November of 2016; it is reportedly in talks with 
creditors to postpone these and other near-term repayments.2 
 
We were particularly intrigued by the view expressed to us by some market analysts concerning 
the legal protections embedded in PDVSA bonds as compared to Venezuelan sovereign bonds. 
Ordinarily, the markets tend to value pure sovereign bonds at a premium over comparable quasi-
sovereign bonds, such that of a state oil company like PDVSA.3 Analysts were telling us, though, 
that the PDVSA bonds were different; that they were as good, and maybe even better, than the 
pure sovereign issuances. The reasons they cited were that: (a) all of the PDVSA bonds required 
unanimous action (100% vote) by the bondholders to modify the payment terms; and (b) 
PDVSA, unlike the sovereign, had substantial assets abroad in its subsidiaries (importantly 
including shares in CITGO in the United States), which might be available for investors to seize 
in a contract enforcement lawsuit. For reasons explained below, we were initially skeptical of 
these arguments. To us, PDVSA bonds looked weaker, not stronger, than the comparable 
sovereign bonds in light of all the relevant legal parameters. That said, the history of sovereign 
bond restructurings—and particularly the recent Greek restructuring of 2012—cautioned us not 
to be too confident about concluding that a quasi-sovereign bond was necessarily going to fare 
worse in a restructuring than a comparable pure sovereign bond. In 2012, the debt of Greek state-
owned firms, and debt guaranteed by the Greek sovereign, did better than comparable Greek 
government bonds. What is more, an examination of the market pricing suggests that smart 
investors had predicted that outcome.4   
                                                 
2 See Sebastian Boyd, Venezuela’s Descent Into World’s Riskiest Sovereign Credit, Bloomberg, February 10, 2016, 
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-10/venezuela-s-descent-into-world-s-riskiest-
sovereign-credit-q-a; Sebastian Boyd & Isabel Gottlieb, Venezuela Bonds Rally as PDVSA Swap Bets Ease Default 
Concern, Bloomberg, July 27, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-27/venezuela-bonds-rally-
as-pdvsa-swap-bets-ease-default-concern.  
3 E.g., Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, The Pricing of Non-Price Terms in Sovereign Bonds: The Case of the Greek 
Guarantees, 1 J. L. FIN. & ACCT. 1 (2016). 
4 Choi & Gulati, supra note 3. 
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Testing Legal Protections: PDVSA Bonds v. Pure Sovereign Bonds 
 
Our initial view, in contrast to the one from analysts we described above, was that the PDVSA 
bonds were probably weaker than comparable sovereign bonds.  Considering the contracts first, 
the PDVSA bonds are more vulnerable than pure sovereign bonds to a restructuring technique 
called the Exit Consent, which has been used in the past to restructure sovereign bonds with 
unanimity provisions, most famously in Ecuador (2000) and Uruguay (2003).5 Exit consents take 
advantage of the fact that the voting threshold for changing important non-financial terms is 
much lower than the 100% needed to change financial terms. Non-financial terms in PDVSA 
bonds can be changed with a 50% vote of the creditors; the threshold in comparable sovereign 
bonds is 66.67%. In other words, PDVSA bonds may have contractual restructuring options 
unavailable for the pure sovereign bonds even where both require unanimity to amend financial 
terms. PDVSA bonds also have an additional measure of insulation against holdout creditor 
lawsuits that the sovereign bonds do not, since PDVSA bonds are issued under a trust structure, 
which requires bondholders to act collectively and indemnify the trustee to sue on their behalf.6 
 
Beyond contracts, we thought it important to highlight that PDVSA is a domestic corporate 
entity in Venezuela, and its bonds have no explicit sovereign guarantee. In extremis, a debtor 
such as PDVSA is vulnerable to asset stripping by the government, which would then leave an 
empty shell for the creditors.7 Venezuela’s oil belongs to the government, not the company, 
while the company itself is subject to a host of obligations to remit funds to the state.8 The state 
has considerable leeway to shift oil assets, change domestic contracts and regulations, and 
impose new, senior obligations on the firm. It could restructure the company entirely, as it has 
                                                 
5 See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 UCLA L. REV. 59 (2000); 
Lee C. Buchheit, How Ecuador Beat the Brady Bond Trap, 19 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 17 (Dec. 2000); Lee C. Buchheit 
& Jeremiah Pam, Uruguay’s Innovations, 19 J. INT’L BANKING L. & REG. 28 (2004).  
6 See e.g., PDVSA 9% Senior Notes Due 2021, Offering Circular dated November 11, 2011, at p. 107. 
7 The risk of being left holding claims on an empty shell of a state-owned bank helped convince Russia’s 
bondholders to grant the government deep debt relief in exchange for claims on the sovereign itself in 2000. See 
Nouriel Roubini & Brad Setser, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS? (PIIE 2005), p. 168, Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin 
Zettelmeyer, DEBT DEFAULTS AND LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF CRISES (MIT Press 2007), p. 108. 
8 See “About PDVSA” at PDVSA.com (last visited July 30, 2016) and “Risk Factors—Risk Factors Relating to 
Venezuela” in PDVSA 9% Senior Notes Due 2021, Offering Circular dated November 11, 2011, pp. 15-16.  
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done in the past, forming a “New-New PDVSA.”9 In a slightly less extreme scenario, PDVSA 
could declare itself bankrupt under Venezuelan law, and force its creditors into an involuntary 
restructuring.10 In any of these cases, those contract terms under New York law would go out the 
window. As for the assets of PDVSA’s foreign subsidiaries, creditors could only nab them if 
they convinced a court to engage in “veil piercing” (effectively ignoring layers of corporate 
personality), something that many try but few succeed at, particularly when the ultimate owner is 
a sovereign.11 
 
A counter to our speculation that domestic bankruptcy in Venezuela could bind PDVSA’s 
foreign creditors and offshore assets is that this can only happen if PDVSA is able to persuade a 
judge in New York to recognize the Venezuelan proceeding and give it legal effect. That a U.S. 
court would do so, however, is by no means certain. If, for example, Venezuela flagrantly 
disregarded the rights creditors bargained for in their New York-law contracts, it might persuade 
a U.S. judge to rule against recognizing the Venezuelan proceeding.12 Finally, there is also a 
political argument against a PDVSA bankruptcy: the company is Venezuela’s crown jewel, 
would any Venezuelan government survive even an hour after declaring PDVSA bankrupt? 
 
In sum, there are multiple elements of legal uncertainty pointing in different directions in 
answering the question whether PDVSA bonds had stronger or weaker safeguards against 
restructuring than pure Venezuelan sovereign bonds. While the uncertainty excited our analyst 
friends, it made it difficult for us to test the effect of contract provisions on bond prices. Without 
having a clear view at the outset whether PDVSA bonds had stronger or weaker legal protections 
                                                 
9 See “About PDVSA-The New PDVSA” at PDVSA.com (last visited July 30, 2016). 
10 See e.g., PDVSA 9% Senior Notes Due 2021, Offering Circular dated November 11, 2011, pp. 20-21. 
11 Assuming, of course, that the subsidiaries would have any assets left to be seized when the time comes.  On 
sovereign veil piercing, see, Brandon Rice, States Behaving Badly: Sovereign Veil Piercing in the Yukos Affair 
(2015 draft), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2673335; Matt Kirtland, Banec 
Applied, Norton Rose Publications (April 2015), available at 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/127743/embancecem-applied  
12 For a discussion of Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in the context of PDVSA, see Pedro Jimenez & 
Amanda Parra Cristie, Restructuring on the Rise for Venezuelan Companies, GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING REV. (April 
11, 2016), available at http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/4adc217c-8e7b-4dbe-afbc-
65e34990b25f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/9fec159b-0b27-4395-b24e-6a4b9e633ec5/11-4-
16_Restructuring_on_the_rise_for_Venezuelan_companies.pdf  
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for minority bondholders than pure sovereign bonds, we could not have a testable prediction 
about which bonds would be valued more by the market. 
 
What we could do, however, was to take our finding for sovereign bonds – that investors paid 
close attention to contractual rights and factored them into bond prices – and use them as a 
starting point, asking whether they valued PDVSA or sovereign bonds more. If we could find a 
price difference, we might infer, based on the last study, that a higher price reflected better 
protection for bondholder minorities. Such an inference would find additional support in 
anecdotal evidence that distressed bonds like Venezuela’s attract specialized investors, who 
focus on legal tools for recovery and have the time and resources to put them to good use. We 
might expect therefore that distressed PDVSA and Venezuelan sovereign bond prices would 
reflect the views of the best, most expensive lawyers in the business. 
 
A meaningful comparison requires PDVSA bonds that are highly similar in most respects to the 
Venezuelan sovereign bonds discussed in the earlier paper. Of all the outstanding PDVSA debt 
securities for which we could obtain information on Bloomberg, we found three that fulfilled our 
minimum selection criteria: dollar-denominated, New York law, fixed coupon, non-callable, 
non-puttable, non-sinking. The three PDVSA bonds matured ten years apart, in 2017, 2027, and 
2037, which allowed us to compare their prices with those of clearly distinct segments of the 
sovereign term structure. However, PDVSA bond maturities only roughly matched those of 
corresponding sovereign bonds, with differences ranging from six to 16 months. Two of the pure 
sovereign bonds in our comparisons are have 100% voting thresholds to change key financial 
terms, the same as PDVSA; the third has a 75% threshold. The main features of these twin bonds 
are summarized in Table 1.   
 
Issuer: Venezuela  Issuer: PDVSA 
Maturity Issue Coupon Size  CAC  ID ISIN  Maturity Issue Coupon Size  CAC ID ISIN 
8/15/18 8/6/98 13.625 0.753 N US922646AT10  4/12/17 4/12/07 5.25 3.0 N XS0294364103 
9/15/27 9/18/97 9.25 4.0 N US922646AS37  4/12/27 4/12/07 5.375 3.0 N XS0294364954 
3/31/38 11/15/07 7 1.25 Y USP97475AJ95  4/12/37 4/12/07 5.5 1.5 N XS0294367205 
 
Table 1. Venezuela and PDVSA twin bonds. Main features of PDVSA and pure sovereign bonds. Coupon is in 
percentage; size is in $bln; CAC is a Y/N indicator for Collective Action Clauses provisions. 
Draft: August 2, 2016 
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Below we report the evolution of their yields, over time, in simple graphs. 
 
The Near-Term Maturity Comparison 
 
In Figure 1, we compare the weekly yield of the PDVSA 5% bond due April 2017 and the 
Venezuela sovereign 13.25% bond due August 2018. Although both require unanimous (100%) 
bondholder consent to amend key financial terms, Figure 1 shows that the market clearly 
perceives the shorter maturity PDVSA bond as riskier than the sovereign bond. The PDVSA 
bond appears to get riskier and riskier relative to the sovereign starting in early 2015, when the 
three major credit rating agencies assigned Venezuela extremely speculative credit ratings, 
signaling near-term default risk. The yield differential between PDVSA and the pure sovereign 
widens to 5000 basis points as the crisis worsens between early 2015 and mid-2016. Given 
Venezuela’s precarious financial position and imminent payment dates for PDVSA debt 
obligations, bonds maturing the soonest are the ones most directly in the line of a potential 
restructurer’s bullets; historically, these tend to lose the most in net present value terms.13 The 
difference in price must reflect a market view that PDVSA bonds are going to do much worse 
than the pure sovereign bonds despite identical 100% restructuring amendment thresholds. Why 
are investors in PDVSA apparently discounting the protections embedded in the voting 
threshold, which appeared so salient in our sovereign bond analysis? 
                                                 
13 See e.g., International Monetary Fund, Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action 
Problems in Sovereign Debt Restructuring (October 2014), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/090214.pdf, at 21-22. 
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Figure 1. Venezuela and PDVSA twin short-term bonds. Yields of near-term PDVSA and matched sovereign 
bonds (top panel) and yield differential between the two (PDVSA minus sovereign, bottom panel). 
 
Potential explanations for the price difference range from a simple gap in maturity dates—the 
PDVSA bond matures more than a year before its sovereign twin—to nuanced contract-based 
explanations such as the ease of deploying exit consents and differences in the pari passu clause 
(PDVSA’s clause is potentially less useful for enforcement). Market participants might also be 
pricing in a likelihood of asset-stripping and bankruptcy for PDVSA. A variant on the asset-
stripping scenario might entail an arrangement like the one with China, well-known in the 
market, whereby PDVSA agreed to sell oil forward at prices favorable to the buyer, effectively 
taking out a loan repayable in oil.14 Depending on the precise structure of payments and 
deliveries, China or another buyer might even advance foreign currency to the government or the 
Central Bank in exchange for oil deliveries by PDVSA. The result would represent a structural 
subordination of PDVSA bonds, both vis a vis Venezuela’s and PDVSA’s obligations to China, 
and vis a vis pure sovereign bonds. An extreme scenario might look like a direct transfer from 
PDVSA to sovereign bond holders. 
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Finally, and paradoxically, the discount we find in the nearest-term PDVSA bonds might reflect 
concerns about a messy restructuring. All else equal, an investor might prefer a bond that is hard 
to amend—because she sees herself as a potential holdout, is reasonably confident of her ability 
to sell to a holdout, or generally wants more bargaining power for creditors vis a vis the 
distressed debtor, embedded in higher voting thresholds. However, when default or restructuring 
is nigh, all else is not equal. Market participants may have knowledge of specialist holdouts 
already holding blocking positions in the bonds, of investment disputes being filed under 
bilateral investment treaties,15 and of exchange offer terms discussed by government officials.  
 
As it becomes clear that the debtor will not pay everyone in full, the creditors begin fighting for 
recovery scraps among themselves—and attach growing importance to knowing precisely who 
else holds claims on the sovereign, and what their strategy might be. For example, an investor 
that wants to hold out but does not have the sophistication or resources of the specialists would 
want to crowd into the bond issues held by the specialists, in effect, free-riding on their prowess. 
Alternatively, an investor that prizes liquidity and does not want to play the long, high-risk 
holdout game is worried about getting stuck in a holdout bond for a long time.16 As a result, the 
same investor that wanted more bargaining power for creditors in general a year earlier now 
might see herself in particular as holding illiquid, defaulted PDVSA bonds indefinitely, having 
her bond payments blocked (as happened in the case of Argentina), or subordinated to a host of 
obscure, poorly understood claims and claimants. Minority bondholder protections that had been 
valuable earlier could backfire against the majority of creditors as more pieces of the 




                                                 
15 Although Venezuela no longer submits to the jurisdiction of the International Center for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), its withdrawal in 2012 does not preclude attempts to lodge claims against it by 
disgruntled direct investors. 
16 For a discussion of how this dynamic can play out, see Anna Gelpern, Ben Heller, & Brad Setser, Count the 
Limbs: Designing Robust Aggregation Clauses in Sovereign Bonds, in TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE: THE QUEST TO 
RESOLVE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES (Martin Guzman, José Antonio Ocampo & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., Columbia U. 
Press 2016). 
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The Longer Maturity Comparisons 
 
Once we saw that the market did not think much of the legal protections in PDVSA’s bonds 
maturing within a year or two, we expected to see a similar pattern in the longer maturity bonds. 
That is, the yields on the sovereign bonds, whether they had a 75% vote or a 100% vote should 
be below those on similar-maturity PDVSA bonds, if the yields reflect the structural 
subordination of PDVSA bonds to sovereign bonds irrespective of their maturity. The results 
might show up in a more muted fashion in bonds maturing decades from now than in the bonds 
maturing in 2017-18, but they should show up nonetheless. 
 
 
Figure 2. Venezuela and PDVSA twin bonds maturing in 2027. Yields of medium-term PDVSA and matched 
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Figure 3. Venezuela and PDVSA twin bonds maturing in 2037-38. Yields of long-term PDVSA and matched 
sovereign bonds (top panel) and yield differential between the two (PDVSA minus sovereign, bottom panel). 
 
We do not find what we expected, not by a wide margin. As Figures 2 and 3 illustrate, when we 
compare the longer-dated PDVSA bonds against similar maturity sovereign bonds, the sovereign 
yields are the ones that are higher. In all three bond pairs—near-term and longer term maturities 
alike—yields start diverging substantially at the end of 2014. However, for the longer-term pairs, 
divergence goes in the opposite direction from what we saw in Figure 1. Long-dated PDVSA 
bonds appear to be more valuable in the eyes of market participants than their sovereign twins. If 
the price difference we measure reflects contractual and other legal protections for minority 
creditors, the result suggests that the market considers longer-term PDVSA bonds to be safer 
than comparable sovereign bonds.  
 
These results seem counterintuitive. Creditor protection embedded in a bond contract and the 
surrounding legal regime does not normally change over time.17 The relative positions of debt 
obligations are generally set at issue. The explanations for the differences between near-term and 
                                                 
17 De facto subordination is fairly common in sovereign debt; however, legislative, regulatory, and judicial 
interventions affecting payment priorities after the debt is issued are rare, and mostly confined to domestic debt. On 
ex-post dilution and subordination, see Patrick Bolton & David Skeel, Inside the Black Box: How Should a 
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longer-term bond prices may not be legal after all. Several additional explanations that echo 
strands of market analysis strike us as plausible. 
 
Four Possible Explanations 
 
Bond (il)Liquidity: It may well be that—for reasons unrelated to contract terms—the liquidity of 
PDVSA bonds vis a vis that of matched sovereign bonds changes over time, and it does so 
differently depending on their residual maturity. Indeed, the evolution of yield differentials we 
observe would be consistent with near-term (resp., longer-term) PDVSA bonds becoming more 
illiquid (resp., more liquid) than pure sovereigns after January 2015. Size and bid-ask spread are 
two popular proxies for bond-level liquidity. Although size is in principle time-varying at the 
bond level—bonds can be called or reopened during their lifetime—this does not happen for the 
PDVSA and the sovereign bonds during our sample period. Which leaves us with the bid-ask 
spread to track variation in liquidity premia. However, data quality issues prevent us from taking 
this route because Bloomberg inevitably reports the same bid and ask prices for PDVSA bonds 
during our sample period. 
 
Issuer Illiquidity, Not Insolvency: Some investors holding Venezuelan bonds (both PDVSA and 
sovereign) argue that the country is facing a temporary liquidity crisis, which requires neither 
dramatic economic reform nor a debt restructuring. If Venezuela secures an emergency cash 
infusion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China, Russia,18 or another source—or if 
it can simply postpone the payment of near-term bond maturities—it might buy time until oil 
prices recover, and it can go back to living off its oil reserves, as one of the largest integrated oil 
companies in the world. This may be an optimistic scenario, however, since oil prices are not 
projected to recover significantly in the short term.19 
 
The IMF Story: So far, Venezuela has not gone to the IMF for assistance with its current crisis.  
Indeed, as of this writing, Venezuela’s Article IV consultation with the IMF, an annual ritual for 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., PDVSA and Rosneft Sign Energy and Education Agreements, PDVSA News Release, July 29, 2016, at 
www.pdvsa.com (announcing a $20 billion investment agreement, among others).   
19 See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, Oil Prices: What’s Behind the Drop?  Simple Economics N.Y. Times, July 27, 2016, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/energy-environment/oil-prices.html?_r=0  
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each member in good standing, has been “delayed” for 127 months. Put differently, the 
relationship between the IMF and Venezuela is not all it could be at the moment.20  If and when 
Venezuela does approach the IMF, the latter may ask for a reprofiling of near-term debt 
maturities or a comprehensive restructuring of sovereign debt; it is most likely to ask for a 
restructuring of PDVSA operations, which are central to the viability of Venezuela’s economy.21 
Bond prices suggest that smart money is betting that the long-dated PDVSA bonds might escape 
restructuring altogether or suffer minimal losses in any such scenario.22 
 
Dynamic Crisis Management and Heterogeneous Investors: The final possibility to consider, 
which we previewed in our discussion of PDVSA bonds maturing next year, is that the legal 
context for sovereign bonds is not static, and neither is market analysis. A government that finds 
itself in the middle of a major political and financial crisis is disproportionately focused on the 
near-term objective of containing it. It will exploit aggressively the legal options in its contracts 
and statutes; this may mean ignoring or legislating away any domestic legal constraints. In 
response, foreign investors might attach greater value to external contractual protections over 
which the sovereign has no control, but might heavily discount domestic legal protections, or 
even penalize the sovereign that has more discretion in crisis management—depending on their 
assessment of the current government’s political preferences.23 
 
Just as the crisis might crystallize a government’s idiosyncratic short-term preferences, so it does 
with investors. As noted earlier, holders of deeply distressed bonds must assess their position not 
only vis a vis the debtor, but also vis a vis the other creditors.24 For example, a bondholder might 
                                                 
20 See International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Holds Informal Briefing on Venezuela, Press Release No. 
16/273, July 26, 2016, available at http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2016/07/26/18/56/PR16363-Venezuela-
IMF-Executive-Board-Holds-Informal-Briefing  
21 For a discussion of the IMF’s pessimistic view on Venezuela’s near term economic prospects, see, e.g., David 
Biller, IMF Sees Venezuela Inflation Rocketing to 720 Percent in 2016, Bloomberg, January 26, 2016, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-22/imf-sees-venezuela-inflation-rocketing-to-720-percent-in-
2016  
22 For an interesting perspective on the PDVSA bonds, see Daniel Urdaneta, The Contrarian’s Take: Why PDVSA 
Might Not Default?, March 7, 2016, available at http://www.caracaschronicles.com/2016/03/07/contrarian-take-
pawn-everything-dont-default/  
23 See Michael Bradley et al., A Sovereign’s Cost of Capital: Go Local or Stay Foreign (2016 draft), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2679077  
24 Skylar Brooks, Domenico Lombardi, Martin Guzman, & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Identifying and Resolving Inter-
Creditor and Debtor-Creditor Equity Issues in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, CIGI Policy Brief 53, January 2015, 
at https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/pb_no53.pdf. 
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prefer to restructure on less-than-ideal terms to holding out or getting stuck in a messy 
restructuring driven by a small group of known holdouts. The same bondholder might prefer to 
hold out rather than accept punitive terms driven by domestic investors under the sway of the 
sovereign debtor. Depending on who is in power and who else holds the claims on the 
sovereign—information that is hard to come by very far in advance—bondholders might attach 
value to different legal parameters and creditor protections. Both legal and political minutiae 
recede to the background in long-term debt. Its pricing is dominated by broad national, regional 
and global macroeconomic trends such as inflation and growth expectations, commodity price 
trends, and the like. 
 
In concrete terms, our results may simply reflect the view that the government of Venezuela 
faces extreme near-term stresses, and has the political will and the legal way to sacrifice 
payments to PDVSA bondholders for the sake of other claims on the sovereign. In the long run, 
the markets seem to be worried about Venezuela’s economic and political prospects, but are 
betting that both Venezuela and PDVSA will weather the current storm. If it survives, then 
rebounding oil prices, hard currency earnings and PDVSA’s relatively robust contracts make it a 




Analyzing the prices of PDVSA bonds side by side with comparable sovereign bonds leads us to 
suspect that the value of some legal and contractual parameters may change, and change 
dramatically over the life of a debt contract. For payments that are decades away, legal terms are 
drowned by macroeconomic and market factors, except where investors expect a deep and 
comprehensive debt restructuring. As financial conditions deteriorate, legal parameters loom 
larger for near-term payments; however, residual uncertainty about the government’s political 
priorities and constraints, and the identity of other creditors, can create peculiar discontinuities. 
Market participants may prefer terms that empower creditor minorities vis a vis the debtor, until 
they find themselves in the cross-hairs of an exotic legal strategy deployed by a super-
empowered holdout. 
 
